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“WITHOUT GOOD CAUSE”: THE CASE FOR A
STANDARD-BASED APPROACH TO DETERMINING
WORKER QUALIFICATION FOR UNEMPLOYMENT
BENEFITS
Emily Toler *
Abstract: Under Washington’s Employment Security Act, workers who voluntarily quit
their jobs are qualified to receive unemployment benefits only if they establish “good cause”
for leaving work. For forty years, the agency that administers the statute and the courts had
substantial discretion to find good cause under the statute’s flexible, standard-based
approach. However, beginning in 1977, the legislature began to restrict the scope of that
discretion by moving toward a rule-based approach. This trend reached its apex in 2009,
when the legislature stripped the agency and the courts of all discretion and limited good
cause to eleven reasons enumerated in the statute. This Comment argues that Washington
should restore administrative and judicial discretion and return to a standard-based approach
to determining whether claimants have good cause for voluntarily leaving work. First, a
standard is more theoretically sound than a rule because workers’ reasons for leaving work
vary significantly and because the usual rationales for rules do not justify their use in the
voluntary quit statute. Second, the rule disqualifies claimants who leave work for reasons
consistent with the purpose of the Act. Finally, a standard is necessary to advance the
purpose of the Act and of unemployment compensation generally.

INTRODUCTION
Unemployment benefits provide a critical buffer against the social
and economic consequences that can befall people who are out of work.
Despite the important role these benefits play, not all unemployed
people are eligible to receive them. In Washington, workers who
voluntarily leave their jobs must establish “good cause” for quitting to
qualify for benefits. 1 For forty years after Washington first provided
unemployment benefits, the “voluntary quit” statute provided a flexible,
standard-based definition of good cause. However, in the 1970s, the
legislature began to narrow the definition of good cause and restrict the
discretion that decision-makers had to determine whether workers
established good cause. This trend ultimately transformed the voluntary
quit statute from a flexible standard to a rigid rule that has disqualified
*
The author worked with the Unemployment Law Project in Seattle, Washington from 2012–2014.
The Unemployment Law Project is a legal aid organization that provides advice and representation
to claimants in unemployment appeals.
1. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(2)(a) (2012).
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thousands of people, even those who left work for reasons consistent
with the purpose of Washington’s Employment Security Act. 2
Part I of this Comment briefly summarizes the history of
unemployment compensation in Washington and outlines the basic
structure and procedure of a claim for unemployment benefits. Part II
summarizes the differences between rules and standards, discusses the
legal contexts in which each approach is more appropriate, and explains
the importance of this distinction. Part III reviews the history of good
cause for leaving work and traces the evolution of the voluntary quit
statute. Part IV argues that the current rule-based approach to making
good cause determinations is inappropriate because a standard-based
approach is more theoretically sound and is necessary to promote both
the goals of the Employment Security Act and of unemployment
compensation generally. Finally, Part V proposes standard-based
language to amend the voluntary quit statute and restore administrative
and judicial discretion to find good cause for leaving work.
I.

UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION IN WASHINGTON

A.

Historical Context and Background

Before the 1930s, no state provided unemployment compensation. 3
However, as the Great Depression ground on, the national
unemployment rate remained stubbornly high, reaching its peak of
25.2% in 1933 and remaining above 15% for virtually the entire decade.4
Many people seeking work were chronically or “hard-core” 5
unemployed: they had been jobless for a year or more, and employers—
for reasons as varied as skepticism about their skills to outright racism—
refused to hire them. 6 This “irreversible structural unemployment” 7
effectively barred “10 percent of the labor force”8 from finding work. 9
Other marginalized people, including older, nonwhite, and unskilled

2. Id. §§ 50.01.05–50.98.110.
3. See Edwin E. Witte, Development of Unemployment Compensation, 55 YALE L.J. 21, 25–29
(1945).
4. Richard J. Jensen, The Causes and Cures of Unemployment in the Great Depression, 19 J.
INTERDISC. HIST. 553, 557 (1989).
5. Id. at 555–56.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 556.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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workers, were far more likely to be unemployed. 10 Many people found
work only through the New Deal’s work relief programs 11 and were
unable to find private employment until World War II. 12
Despite this crisis, and despite a “rapidly growing interest in
unemployment insurance throughout the country,” 13 the states remained
reluctant to enact unemployment compensation legislation. 14 To induce
the states to adopt such laws, Congress introduced a cooperative federalstate system to administer unemployment compensation 15 as part of the
Social Security Act of 1935. 16 The strategy proved successful, and in
just two years, every state had passed unemployment compensation
laws. 17
Washington was by no means among the first states to act, 18 but in
1937, the legislature passed the Unemployment Compensation Act. 19 In
the Act’s statement of purpose, the legislature recognized that
“economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious menace to the
health, morals and welfare of the people of this state,” 20 and enacted the
legislation “to prevent its spread and to lighten its burden which now so
often falls with crushing force upon the unemployed worker and his
family.” 21 The Act was to protect unemployed people “against this

10. See id. at 567–71; Robert A. Margo, Employment and Unemployment in the 1930s, 7 J. ECON.
PERSP. 41, 53–54 (1993) (noting the exacerbating effects of long-term unemployment).
11. Robert A. Margo, The Microeconomics of Depression Unemployment, 51 J. ECON. HIST. 333,
337–39 (1991).
12. See id. at 339.
13. Witte, supra note 3, at 26.
14. See id. at 25–29. For example, in 1931, twenty-three bills were introduced in state
legislatures, but none was passed. Id. at 26. In 1933, “68 bills were introduced in 25 states,” but
none was made law. Id. at 27. States were also reluctant to adopt unemployment compensation
programs because they worried about “handicapp[ing their] employers in interstate markets by
burdening them with costs their competitors in other states were not required to meet.” Id. at 28.
15. Id. at 22, 32.
16. Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 301–1397jj (2006)).
17. Witte, supra note 3, at 34.
18. See id. at 33 (discussing the states that enacted unemployment compensation laws before or
soon after the federal bill’s passage).
19. Unemployment Compensation Act, ch. 162, 1937 Wash. Sess. Laws 574 (codified as
amended at WASH. REV. CODE §§ 50.01.05–50.98.110 (2012 & Supp. 2013)). In 1953, the Act was
renamed and given its current title, the Employment Security Act. Employment Security Act, ch. 8,
sec. 24, § 1, 1953 Wash. Sess. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 884, 904 (codified as amended at WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 50.01.05–50.98.110).
20. Unemployment Compensation Act § 2, 1937 Wash. Sess. Laws at 574.
21. Id. at 574–75.
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greatest hazard of our economic life,” 22 and it was to “be liberally
construed for the purpose of reducing involuntary unemployment and
the suffering caused thereby to the minimum.” 23
Notwithstanding this sweeping language, national debates about
unemployment compensation had already made it clear that benefits
would not be available to all workers. Instead, they would be available
only to workers who (in addition to other eligibility criteria) had not
committed some disqualifying act:
Whatever the plan, such [unemployment] insurance is based
upon the assumption that society and industry bear a
responsibility for the failure of the economic system to provide
men with an opportunity to support themselves by their own
work. For those who, on the other hand, are unemployed
because they prefer idleness to labor, the insurance measures
accept no responsibility. The problem of framing a practical
scheme to separate the wheat from the chaff thus centers in a
definition of compensable unemployment.
If a man voluntarily leaves a job without reasonable cause, or
is discharged for misconduct, his unemployment presents the
clearest kind of case for which no social responsibility is
assumed. 24
Washington’s Unemployment Compensation Act reflected those same
concerns. The Act disqualified claimants who received certain other
public benefits (e.g., social security), 25 were out of work because of a
labor dispute, 26 failed to search for or accept suitable work without good
cause, 27 were discharged for work-connected misconduct, 28 or
voluntarily left work without good cause. 29
The current statute retains these disqualification provisions 30 and adds
disqualifications for misrepresentation, 31 attending school, 32and failing

22. Id. at 575.
23. Id.
24. The Definition of Unemployment in Unemployment Insurance Measures, 44 HARV. L. REV.
285, 286 (1930) (footnotes omitted) (summarizing trends in proposed unemployment compensation
legislation).
25. Unemployment Compensation Act § 5(f), 1937 Wash. Sess. Laws at 582.
26. Id. § 5(e), at 581–82.
27. Id. § 5(d), at 580–81.
28. Id. § 5(b), at 580.
29. Id. § 5(a), at 580.
30. See generally WASH. REV. CODE §§ 50.20.044–50.20.090 (2012).
31. Id. § 50.20.070.
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to attend a mandatory “job search workshop” or other training course. 33
Most of the current disqualification provisions are substantially the
same as their 1937 counterparts. 34 However, the legislature has enacted
significant changes to two of the provisions: discharge for workconnected misconduct 35 and voluntarily leaving work without good
cause. 36 This Comment focuses on the disqualification for voluntarily
leaving work without good cause. 37
B.

The Basic Structure and Procedure of a Claim for Unemployment
Benefits in Washington

The Employment Security Department (ESD) is the agency that
administers the Employment Security Act.38 The ESD is, in turn,
administered by a Commissioner 39 who has the authority to delegate
various ESD functions as necessary. 40
A worker who is separated from a job may apply for unemployment
benefits by filing a claim with the ESD. 41 The ESD then contacts the
claimant and the claimant’s former employer to determine why the job

32. Id. § 50.20.095. If claimants can prove that they are actually available for work, despite
attending school, they may not be disqualified. Id. § 50.20.095(3).
33. Id. § 50.20.044.
34. Compare Unemployment Compensation Act, ch. 162, § 5(e), 1937 Wash. Sess. Laws 574,
581–82 (codified as amended at PIERCE’S WASH. CODE ANN., tit. 6233, § 305(e) (1939)), with
WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.090 (disqualifying claimants who are unemployed because of a strike or
lockout).
35. Compare Unemployment Compensation Act, ch. 162, § 5(b), 1937 Wash. Sess. Laws 574,
580 (codified as amended at PIERCE’S WASH. CODE ANN., tit. 6233, § 305(b) (1939)) (standardbased statute), with WASH. REV. CODE § 50.04.294 (rule-based statute).
36. Compare Unemployment Compensation Act § 5(a), 1937 Wash. Sess. Laws at 580 (standardbased statute), with WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(2)(b) (rule-based statute).
37. The misconduct disqualification has undergone significant revision and is primarily based on
rules rather than standards. In 2003, the legislature replaced the previous definition (“an employee’s
act or failure to act in willful disregard of his or her employer’s interest where the effect of the
employee’s act or failure to act is to harm the employer’s business”) with a list of rules. Act of June
20, 2003, ch. 4, sec. 5, § 1, 2003 Wash. Sess. Laws 2d Spec. Sess. 2782, 2787 (codified at WASH.
REV. CODE § 50.04.294). This change has had important effects on worker qualification for
benefits. See, e.g., Daniels v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t, 168 Wash. App. 721, 731, 281 P.3d 310, 314–15
(2012) (noting the differences between the statutes in denying the claimant benefits). However,
discussing the effects of both disqualification provisions is beyond the scope of this Comment.
38. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.08.010.
39. Id.
40. Id. § 50.12.020.
41. Id. § 50.20.140; see also WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 192-110-005 (2010) (explaining how
claimants can apply for benefits).
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ended. 42 After finishing its investigation, the ESD sends both parties an
initial determination notice that explains whether the claimant will
receive benefits. 43
To be eligible for benefits, claimants must have worked at least 680
hours in their base years 44 in qualifying employment. 45 Claimants must
also show that they are able to work, available to accept work, and
actively seeking suitable work, 46 and that their jobs did not end for a
disqualifying reason. 47 Disqualifying reasons include discharge for
misconduct 48 and voluntarily leaving work without good cause. 49
Any party that disagrees with the ESD’s initial determination has the
right to appeal 50 and to appear at a hearing in front of an Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ). 51 The ALJ conducts the hearing and issues an initial
order. 52 The initial order can be appealed to the Commissioner’s Review
Office, 53 which issues final agency decisions. 54 The Commissioner can
choose to publish some decisions, which gives them precedential value
with the Commissioner’s Review Office and makes them binding on
ALJs. 55 All Commissioner’s decisions are subject to judicial review
under Washington’s Administrative Procedure Act. 56

42. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 192-130-080 (2010); id. §§ 192-120-030, -040 (2004).
43. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 50.20.140, 50.20.150, 50.20.180.
44. Id. § 50.04.030; see also id. § 50.04.020 (generally defining “base year” as “either the first
four of the last five completed calendar quarters or the last four completed calendar quarters”).
45. See id. § 50.04.100 (defining “employment”). The Employment Security Act contains a
general test for excepted employment. Id. § 50.04.140. It also excludes from coverage certain types
of work. See id. §§ 50.04.148–50.04.275 (2012 & Supp. 2013) (excluding, for example, certain
musicians, barbers, outside salespeople, newspaper carriers, and amateur sports officials). Part-time
work is generally qualifying employment. See id. § 50.04.100 (2012).
46. Id. § 50.20.010.
47. Id. §§ 50.20.066, 50.20.050.
48. Id. § 50.20.066; see also id. § 50.04.294 (defining “misconduct”).
49. Id. § 50.20.050.
50. Id. § 50.32.020.
51. Id. § 50.32.010.
52. Id. § 50.32.060; WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 192-04-150 (2013).
53. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.32.070. The Commissioner delegates the authority to consider
petitions for review to the Commissioner’s Review Office. See id. § 50.12.020 (authorizing the
Commissioner to “delegate . . . the right to decide matters placed in the commissioner’s discretion
under this title”). For simplicity, and consistent with the practice of Washington courts, this
Comment refers to decisions from the Commissioner’s Review Office as Commissioner’s decisions.
54. Id. § 50.32.090.
55. Id. § 50.32.095.
56. Id. § 34.05.570 (2012).
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RULES AND STANDARDS

The American legal system is caught between two opposing views:
one that “places a high premium on the creation and application of
general rules,” 57 and one that favors standards and “places a high
premium on . . . case-by-case decisions, narrowly tailored to the
particulars of individual circumstances.” 58 Rule-based laws are arguably
the more popular of the two. 59 But for all its vogue, an “extravagantly
rule-bound conception of the rule of law” 60 ignores an important point
about due process and justice: individual people with unique cases and
circumstances deserve an opportunity to be heard. 61
This Part summarizes the differences between rules and standards. It
also explains why rules are preferable in some legal contexts, while
standards are preferable in others. Finally, it explains that the choice
between rule- and standard-based laws reflects fundamental beliefs and
important policy decisions about the proper roles of individuals, society,
and the law.
A.

The Differences Between Rules and Standards

Rules and standards are often compared as opposites. Rules are “hard
and fast,” while standards are “open-ended.” 62 Rules are “bright line[s],”
while standards are “flexible.” 63 Rules “specif[y] in advance” a legal
response to an action, while standards allow an after-the-fact legal
determination about whether the action is appropriate, under the
circumstances. 64 Two classic examples come from traffic laws: “do not

57. Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 956 (1995).
58. Id. at 956–57.
59. Id. at 957 (discussing the “pervasive social phenomenon” of the fascination with rules). See
generally Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989)
(discussing the value of rules in the context of judge-made law).
60. Sunstein, supra note 57, at 957.
61. Id. at 958 (“[P]eople are entitled to argue that they are relevantly different from those that
have come before, and that when their case is investigated in all its particularity, it will be shown
that special treatment is warranted.”). This concept is discussed in infra Part IV.A.2.
62. Sunstein, supra note 57, at 959.
63. Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 379 (1985). Professor Schlag
believes thinking of rules and standards as a simple dialectic is unsatisfactory. See id. at 399–426.
However, for the purposes of this Comment, the simple distinction is sufficient.
64. Eric A. Posner, Standards, Rules, and Social Norms, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 101, 101
(1997). Of course, rules cannot perfectly “specify [all] outcomes before particular cases arise,”
because “no approach to law is likely to avoid allowing at least some legal judgments to be made in
the context of deciding actual cases.” Sunstein, supra note 57, at 961 (emphasis in original).
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drive more than 60 miles per hour” is a rule, while “do not drive
unreasonably fast” is a standard; 65 “stop and look” at every railroad
crossing is a rule, while “act with reasonable caution” is a standard.66
Rules are advantageous when they are used to govern similar
behavior that occurs in similar situations and that occurs very
frequently. 67 This frequency is the critical distinction: “the greater the
frequency with which a legal command will apply, the more desirable
rules tend to be relative to standards.” 68 Examples of laws applied with
frequency include traffic laws and the income tax code, both of which
govern billions of incidents and transactions every year. 69 However,
frequency refers not to the absolute number of incidents, but to the
“frequency of behavior with the relevant common elements.” 70
Therefore, even for transactions that occur many times each year, a rule
is not necessarily preferable unless the transactions are almost identical.
Additionally, rules may be preferable if they are designed to promote
a particular set of perceived virtues and discourage a set of perceived
vices. 71 If policymakers determine that a law should promote “certainty,
uniformity, stability, and security,” 72 or neutrality, efficiency, and
autonomy, 73 a rule may serve those interests more suitably than a
standard.
However, rules are not well suited to meet every legal need. Instead,
rules may be inappropriate because they promote intransigence,
regimentation, and rigidity, 74 or sclerosis, punitiveness, and
compulsiveness. 75 Rules are also bound to be over- and under-inclusive,
65. Id. at 959.
66. Schlag, supra note 63, at 379.
67. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 563
(1992) (“To illustrate the analysis, consider the problem of regulating the disposal of hazardous
substances. For chemicals used frequently in settings with common characteristics—such as dry
cleaning and automotive fluids—a rule will tend to be desirable.”).
68. Id. at 577.
69. See id. at 563–64.
70. Id. at 600 (emphasis added).
71. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1685, 1710 (1976) (listing examples of “[t]he different values that people commonly associate with
the formal modes of rule and standard”); Schlag, supra note 63, at 399 (explaining that “the most
common view of the rules v. standards dialectic ascribes one set of virtues and vices to rules and
another set of virtues and vices to standards,” but noting that, in his opinion, that view is
unsatisfactory).
72. Schlag, supra note 63, at 400.
73. See Kennedy, supra note 71, at 1710.
74. Schlag, supra note 63, at 400.
75. Kennedy, supra note 71, at 1710.
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as well as unable to adapt to new circumstances. 76 They also deprive
decision-makers of the legitimate need for discretion and may unfairly or
disproportionately affect particular social groups. 77 In addition to these
conceptual shortcomings, rules may fail as a practical matter because of
“unanticipated developments” or because “they run up against
intransigent beliefs about how particular cases should be resolved.” 78
Standards, by contrast, are more suitable when the law must address
behavior that occurs “in settings that vary substantially,” 79 or when a law
applies to “heterogeneous behavior.” 80 The classic example is the law of
negligence: because it must govern “a wide array of . . . scenarios, many
of which are materially different from each other,” 81 its legal principles
are standard-based (e.g., due care and reasonableness). 82
Standards also promote a particular set of virtues. 83 Standards enable
flexibility, evolution, tolerance, empathy, and equity, 84 as well as
“individuali[sm], open-endedness, and dynamism.” 85 In addition to
promoting these values, standards also allow individualized
adjudications and give effect to the essential principle that “[c]ase-bycase decisions are an important part of legal justice.” 86
Of course, like rules, standards are not perfect. Enabling flexibility
and discretion does lead to risks of “the abusive exercise of discretion,
lack of predictability or of the capacity to form expectations, high costs
of decisions, [and] failure of political accountability.” 87 And unbound,
pure case-by-case decision-making is both undesirable and impossible. 88
But standards are neither hopelessly open-ended nor arbitrary; instead,

76. Sunstein, supra note 57, at 992–94. But see Kaplow, supra note 67, at 586–96 (discussing the
problem of inclusiveness and concluding that standards may not inherently be more effective at
considering all relevant factors).
77. Sunstein, supra note 57, at 992–96.
78. Id. at 957.
79. Kaplow, supra note 67, at 563.
80. Id. at 564.
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 71, at 1688 (listing examples of standards, including “good
faith, due care, fairness, unconscionability, unjust enrichment, and reasonableness”).
83. Schlag, supra note 63, at 400.
84. Kennedy, supra note 71, at 1710.
85. Schlag, supra note 63, at 400.
86. Sunstein, supra note 57, at 957.
87. Id. at 958.
88. See, e.g., id. at 957 (“Few if any judgments about particular cases are entirely
particular. . . . Case-by-case particularism is not a promising foundation for law.”). See generally
Scalia, supra note 59 (discussing the limitations of discretionary decision-making).
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“standards will receive a degree of specification as they are interpreted,
since officials may generate categories of cases that, under the standard,
receive predictable treatment.” 89
B.

A Legislature’s Choice Between Rules and Standards Reflects
Important Policy Decisions About the Proper Relationship
Between Individuals, Society, and the Law

The distinction between rules and standards is not just abstract or
academic. 90 Instead, it is both pervasive and important: “[t]he
controversy arises in every area of law; it often involves fundamental
liberties.” 91 When choosing whether to adopt a rule or a standard,
legislators must consider the economic effects of their choice,92
including how to allocate costs and benefits. 93 Legislators must also
respond to social norms, whether by embracing or rejecting those
norms. 94
Perhaps more importantly, choosing whether to adopt a rule or a
standard requires legislators to take sides in a fundamental conflict about
the proper relationship between individuals, society, and the law—a
conflict “between irreconcilable visions of humanity and society, and
between radically different aspirations for our common future.” 95
Professor Duncan Kennedy described this conflict as one between
individualism and altruism96—between self-interest and “self-reliance” 97
(often expressed by rules) 98 on the one hand, and “sharing and

89. Sunstein, supra note 57, at 965.
90. Kennedy, supra note 71, at 1712 (“Thus the pro-rules and pro-standards positions are more
than an invitation to a positivist investigation of reality. They are also an invitation to choose
between sets of values and visions of the universe.”); id. at 1713–22 (describing how the
rules-standards debate reflects a fundamental conflict between individualism and altruism).
91. Sunstein, supra note 57, at 957 (footnotes omitted).
92. See generally Kaplow, supra note 67 (analyzing the economic implications of rule- and
standard-based laws).
93. See Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 73–74
(1983) (identifying “[r]ate of [c]ompliance,” “[o]ver- and [u]nder-[i]nclusiveness,” “[c]osts of
[r]ulemaking,” and the “[c]ost of [a]pplying a [r]ule” as “four principal subcategories of potential
costs and benefits”).
94. See Posner, supra note 64, at 107–13 (discussing the development of social norms and
theoretical explanations for why and how legislators respond to those norms).
95. Kennedy, supra note 71, at 1685.
96. See id. at 1713–24.
97. Id. at 1713.
98. See id. at 1710 (listing values that rules promote, including “[s]elf-reliance”).
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sacrifice” 99 (often expressed by standards) 100 on the other.
In sum, the choice matters because it reflects fundamental beliefs
about how society should be ordered—and about whether and how the
law should intervene in that order.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF GOOD CAUSE FOR LEAVING WORK
The Employment Security Act has always disqualified claimants who
voluntarily leave work without good cause from receiving
unemployment benefits. 101 However, the definition of good cause
evolved significantly during the last seventy years. The 1937 Act was a
quintessential standard that provided no definition of good cause 102 and
gave the agency and the courts broad discretion to interpret the phrase. 103
But as the legislature revised the statute, it consistently limited the
circumstances that can constitute good cause and restricted
administrative and judicial discretion to find it.104
This Part traces the evolution of the voluntary quit statute through
three main historical periods: 1945–1977, 1977–2003, and 2003–present.
For each period, it summarizes relevant administrative and judicial
decisions, describes the statutory language at the time, identifies
important amendments to the statute, and discusses the effects of the
amendments. Most importantly, it explains how the amendments
redefined good cause, transforming a broad, flexible standard into a
narrow, rigid rule.
A.

The Era of the Standard: 1945–1977

The 1937 Act did not define good cause. 105 However, in 1945, the
legislature amended the Act and directed the agency to consider a
number of factors when determining whether a claimant had good cause
for leaving work: 106 “the degree of risk involved to [the claimant’s]

99. Id. at 1717.
100. See id. at 1710 (listing values that standards promote, including “[e]mpathy,” “[t]olerance,”
and “[c]ommunity”).
101. Unemployment Compensation Act, ch. 162, § 5(a), 1937 Wash. Sess. Laws 574, 580
(codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050 (2012)).
102. Id.
103. See infra Part III.A.
104. See infra Parts III.B–C.
105. Unemployment Compensation Act § 5(a), 1937 Wash. Sess. Laws at 580 (codified as
amended at PIERCE’S WASH. CODE ANN., tit. 6233, § 305(a) (1939)).
106. Act of Mar. 7, 1945, ch. 35, § 78, 1945 Wash. Sess. Laws 76, 116 (codified at WASH. REV.
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health, safety, and morals, his physical fitness and prior training, . . . the
distance of the available work from his residence,” 107 and—
importantly—“such other factors as the Commissioner may deem
pertinent.” 108 This language granted the agency and the courts broad
discretion to find good cause.
The Commissioner’s first published decision interpreting good cause,
In re Hurd, 109 concerned the scope of that discretion. Earl Hurd left work
in order to accept a new job. 110 After Hurd quit, he learned that the new
job was no longer available and filed a claim for unemployment
benefits. 111 The Commissioner noted that the circumstances that led
Hurd to leave work were “elements not specifically described” in the
statute. 112 However, the Commissioner concluded that those
circumstances were the sort of “other factors” the agency had discretion
to consider. 113
The Commissioner 114 and the courts 115 also accepted that “certain
personal reasons advanced by the particular claimant [can rise] to the
stature of ‘good cause.’” 116 To establish good cause, claimants had to
show a “compelling personal reason” 117 for leaving work. The
Commissioner defined a compelling personal reason as “a predicament
[in which the claimant] had no alternative but to immediately sever [the]
employer-employee relationship,” 118 or “circumstances of such a nature
that left [the claimant] no alternative but to leave . . . employment.” 119
Through 1976, the agency and the courts had considerable discretion
to find that a claimant quit for a compelling personal reason, and found
good cause when the claimant left work:
CODE § 50.05.11 (1946)). The Commissioner used these same factors to determine whether work
was suitable for a claimant. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Hurd, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 114 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1954), 1954 WL 46417.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Zemek, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 326 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1956), 1956 WL 58119.
115. In re Bale, 63 Wash. 2d 83, 385 P.2d 545 (1963) (holding that a claimant had good cause
when she left work to join her husband, who had accepted a job in a different city).
116. Zemek, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 326 (emphasis added).
117. Morse, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 157 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1955), 1955 WL 47633.
118. Tuai, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 162 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1955), 1955 WL 47638
(emphasis in original).
119. Jones, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 964 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1973), 1973 WL 166598.
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to preserve a marriage in the face of divorce,120 as long as
there was a “serious threat to the marital relationship;” 121
when both spouses could not be employed in the same area 122
(although women were more likely than men to establish
good cause, under the theory that wives had a duty to follow
their husbands, but not vice versa); 123
to marry, if the fiancé/e was employed far from the
claimant; 124
to avoid suppression of “free expression of thought” about
union activities; 125
because the distance to the workplace from the claimant’s
home was unreasonable 126 or would result in hardship; 127

120. Haskins, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 512 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1962), 1962 WL
76374; Seeley, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 165 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1955), 1955 WL 47641.
121. Susinski, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 1170 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1974), 1974 WL
177539 (disqualifying the claimant because he left work to “insure the happiness and tranquility of
his family, rather than to preserve the marriage”).
122. Ayers v. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 85 Wash. 2d 550, 552–53, 536 P.2d 610, 611–12 (1975) (“If
employment for the husband and for the wife are not available in the same area, it is a compelling
personal reason and, therefore, good cause for one of the spouses to leave employment and go to the
place of employment of the other spouse in order to keep the family together. The decision as to
which place of employment should be accepted . . . is generally a decision which the spouses should
make for themselves, subject to the need to make a reasonable decision.”). But see Beckmeyer,
Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 178 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1976), 1976 WL 183403 (holding
that the claimant lacked good cause for leaving work to accompany a spouse when the move was
voluntary, rather than as a result of a choice between competing offers of employment).
123. Balcom, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 249 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1976), 1976 WL
183474 (“The claimant protests what he feels to be the application of a ‘double standard,’ in that if
the situation were reversed and his wife had quite [sic] her job to follow him to Chicago where he
had a better job, benefits would be allowed to her. This is probably true . . . . There is, however, no
corresponding duty on the part of a husband to accompany his wife and live at the home she has
selected.” (citing In re Bale, 63 Wash. 2d 83, 91, 385 P.2d 545, 549 (1963))); see also Dickey,
Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 293 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1977), 1977 WL 191836 (claimant,
who left work to move with her husband, had good cause because “[t]he Bale rule does not
encompass ‘reasonableness’ but only that a wife has a compelling personal reason to leave her
employment to move with her husband to the home of his choice.”).
124. Pedersen, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 811 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1970), 1970 WL
118071. However, leaving work for marriage alone was not good cause. Id.
125. Bittle, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 320 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1956), 1956 WL 58113.
126. Leaving work due to distance was good cause when other circumstances weighed in favor of
that conclusion. See, e.g., Stokesberry, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 980 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t
1973), 1973 WL 166614 (holding that claimant had good cause because his long commute was
damaging his family relationships); Hatch, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 331 (Wash. Emp’t Sec.
Dep’t 1956), 1956 WL 58124 (holding that claimant had good cause because his move in order to
lead a religious congregation rendered his commute unreasonable). Sometimes distance alone was
enough to establish good cause. See Hutchins, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 222 (Wash. Emp’t Sec.
Dep’t 1955), 1955 WL 47697. But see Emmons, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 1134 (Wash. Emp’t

18 - Toler Comment.docx (Do Not Delete)

6/6/2014 12:21 PM

572

[Vol. 89:559

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
•
•

•

because of illness 128—including illnesses such as stress and
anxiety 129—if the claimant first made “reasonable efforts to
preserve” the job 130 and provided medical documentation; 131
because of the illness of a spouse 132 or other family
members, 133 but only if it was necessary for the claimant to
leave work and a leave of absence or other accommodation
was unreasonable; 134
after a union decertification election, rather than forfeit health
and pension benefits; 135

Sec. Dep’t 1974), 1974 WL 177502 (holding that a claimant who lived in Tacoma did not have
good cause for leaving work in Seattle because he possessed “an occupational skill unique to the
aircraft industry,” which made work at Boeing’s Seattle location suitable). Eventually, the
Commissioner identified four patterns of quit-due-to-distance cases and provided a framework for
adjudicating each type. See Chitwood, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 305 (Wash. Emp’t Sec.
Dep’t 1977), 1977 WL 191848.
127. Watson, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 121 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1954), 1954 WL 46424
(holding that claimant had good cause because his job was transferred to San Francisco and
continuing work would lead to “extended absences from his family,” which would be an
abandonment of his “domestic obligations”).
128. See, e.g., Luby, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 1155 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1974), 1974
WL 177524 (holding that claimant, who worked in Alaska, had good cause because the climate
caused him to suffer severe nosebleeds). A claimant who left work due to illness, or risk of illness,
was generally required, “if the risk is one borne by all those employed in the occupation . . . to show
that he was affected to a greater extent than the other workers in the same or similar occupation.”
Yost, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 1210 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1975), 1975 WL 175236
(disqualifying claimant for failure to show additional effect).
129. Martin, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 2d 265 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1976), 1976 WL
183490.
130. Pitsaroff, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 1209 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1975), 1975 WL
175235 (disqualifying claimant who left work due to risk of illness because he “did not make a
reasonable effort to preserve his [employment] relationship by requesting consideration for a
transfer”).
131. Mallen, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 1212 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1975), 1978 WL
175238 (“[T]he severity and effect of medical and/or emotional problems are best judged on the
basis of competent medical evidence.”). Luby, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 1155, was an
exception to the general rule that claimants must provide medical documentation advising them to
leave work before they quit.
132. Buxton, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 799 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1969), 1969 WL
102130.
133. Hopper, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 990 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1973), 1973 WL
166624.
134. Johnson, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 1105 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1974), 1974 WL
177473 (disqualifying claimant who left work to assist his ailing grandparents because he knew
other relatives were coming to assist and, therefore, should have asked for a leave of absence until
they arrived).
135. Matison v. Hutt, 85 Wash. 2d 836, 839–40, 539 P.2d 852, 854 (1975) (recognizing as
“compelling” the “jeopardy to [the claimants’] health and welfare benefits . . . [and] pension
benefits,” and rejecting a categorical rule that would “deny[] benefits where the claimant’s personal
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to preserve a relationship with children 136 or to provide child
care, as long as the claimant tried to make other arrangements
and leaving work was a last resort; 137 and
• because of a reasonable belief that a new job was available.138
However, even if claimants established a compelling personal reason,
they were still required to “do everything possible to retain the
employer-employee relationship” 139 before quitting. Often, they had to
inform their employers about the personal reason and provide them an
opportunity to address it. 140 Claimants were also generally expected to
“exhaust, or . . . at least explore all other avenues prior to quitting,” 141
unless no alternatives were reasonably available. 142
Compelling personal reasons were not the only way claimants could
establish good cause. The Commissioner also found good cause for
many work-related reasons not specifically addressed in the statute:
• when a claimant’s work violated her moral or religious
beliefs; 143
reasons for terminating unemployment are union related”).
136. Wright, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 1173 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1974), 1990 WL
10049283.
137. Odanovich, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 1202 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1974), 1974 WL
177570 (holding that claimant had good cause when she tried to, but could not, resolve her child
care problem); see also Rogers, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 1204 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1974),
1974 WL 177572 (disqualifying claimant because he did not make “every reasonable effort to
resolve the problem prior to summarily quitting his job”). But see Christie, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r
Dec. 2d No. 262 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1976), 1976 WL 1838487 (holding that claimant had
good cause when a new schedule created child care problems, even when she did not report those
problems to her employer, because she was given an ultimatum: accept the new schedule or quit).
138. Edquist, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 188 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1976), 1976 WL
183413.
139. Courtright, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 552 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1963), 1963 WL
67420 (although domestic problems were a compelling personal reason, claimant lacked good cause
because she did not give the employer an opportunity to preserve her job).
140. See, e.g., id. However, the Commissioner rejected a categorical application of this rule,
recognizing that, under some circumstances, claimants were not required to notify the employer or
do everything possible to preserve the job. See, e.g., Conner, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 759
(Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1968), 1968 WL 95764 (holding that claimant was not required to “do
everything in his power to correct” his employer’s failure to pay him the minimum wage before
leaving work).
141. Jones, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 964 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1973), 1973 WL 166598.
142. Cuvreau, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 993 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1973), 1973 WL
166627 (claimant whose employer likely had no other work available had good cause for leaving
work that aggravated his health condition, even though he did not request a transfer).
143. Peters, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 377 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1978), 1978 WL
209141 (disqualifying the claimant, who left work because she could not afford union dues, but
observing that claimants had established good cause in “case[s] involving a sincere bonafide [sic]
religious, personal, moral or secular belief of a clearly established and compelling nature”);
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when an employer refused to honor the terms of a contract; 144
when a claimant’s hours were substantially reduced; 145
when working conditions caused a claimant to suffer
substantial embarrassment 146 or frustration; 147 and
• for financial reasons, such as when the claimant had
“substantial grounds for believing his wages will not be paid
him when they are due,” 148 when the employer did not pay
minimum wage, 149 or when there was a “manifest
discrepancy” between the claimant’s wages and the prevailing
wage. 150
The Commissioner and the courts also exercised discretion to identify a
number of reasons for leaving work that did not constitute good cause:
• a claimant’s desire to retire 151 or collect social security
benefits; 152
• a claimant’s desire to seek work with more favorable

Holtzman, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 408 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1958), 1958 WL 59433
(holding that a claimant whose religion prevented him from joining a labor organization had good
cause for leaving a job that required him to join a union). The Commissioner did not analyze these
cases as “compelling personal reasons” cases because the Act provided that work risking or
violating a claimant’s morals could be unsuitable. See Act of Mar. 7, 1945, ch. 35, § 78, 1945 Wash.
Sess. Laws 76, 116 (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.100 (2012) (“In determining
whether work is suitable for an individual, the commissioner shall also consider the degree of risk
involved to the individual’s health, safety, and morals . . . .”)).
144. Johnson, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 504 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1958), 1958 WL
59352.
145. Edquist, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 188 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1976), 1976 WL
183413.
146. Wageman, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 1020 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1973), 1973 WL
166654 (holding that claimant had good cause after quitting due to the employer’s “unprovoked
outburst of profanity directed at the [claimant] under circumstances resulting in public
embarassment [sic] and humiliation”).
147. Markholt, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 361 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1977), 1977 WL
191904 (holding that claimant had good cause when she “was given a certain degree of high
responsibility without the concomitant control and authority to carry it out” and “was harassed by
co-workers and not afforded opportunity for an uninterrupted lunch break”).
148. Hilker, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 173 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1955), 1955 WL 47648.
149. Conner, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 759 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1968), 1968 WL
95764.
150. Schully, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 213 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1955), 1955 WL
47688.
151. Taylor, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 862 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1971), 1971 WL
129518.
152. Wagner, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 1141 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1974), 1974 WL
177509.
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wages 153 or hours; 154
• a claimant’s dissatisfaction with working conditions 155 or
simple boredom; 156
• a claimant’s desire to attend school; 157
• a claimant’s desire to be self-employed; 158
• a claimant’s belief that he or she would be replaced, 159
discharged, 160 or laid off; 161 and
• a claimant’s personality conflicts with a supervisor. 162
In sum, good cause determinations through 1976 were fact-specific
and standard-based, and every case required the agency or the courts to
exercise considerable discretion. However, beginning in 1977, the
legislature began to restrict the scope of that discretion by moving
toward an increasingly rule-based statute.

153. Cowles Publ’g Co. v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t, 15 Wash. App. 590, 595–97 550 P.2d 712, 716–17
(1976) (disqualifying claimant who left work because of “low wages and lack of promotional
opportunity”).
154. Pavlick, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 665 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1966), 1966 WL 88855
(disqualifying claimant who quit because of “her personal desire to retire in order to seek work
which would entail less [sic] nighttime hours”).
155. Johnson, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 1259 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1975), 1975 WL
175283 (disqualifying claimant who quit because he believed that a more senior employee was
“interfer[ing] with his job duties”); Dietz, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 1060 (Wash. Emp’t Sec.
Dep’t 1973), 1973 WL 166694 (disqualifying claimant who quit because of “dissatisfaction over
working conditions and his feeling that the supervision was inadequate”); Hayner, Emp’t Sec.
Comm’r Dec. No. 1013 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1973), 1973 WL 166647 (disqualifying claimant
who quit because of dissatisfaction with having too little work); Sculati, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec.
No. 1039 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1973), 1973 WL 166673 (“Nor do we consider that a failure to
promote or transfer, coupled with a ‘hard’ job, is good cause for quitting . . . .”).
156. Dinoia, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 1115 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1974), 1974 WL
177483.
157. Stewart, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 948 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1973), 1973 WL
166582. Under the current Act, claimants who leave work to attend an approved “apprenticeship
program” are not disqualified. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(2)(b)(xi) (2012).
158. Noble, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 345 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1957), 1957 WL 56218.
159. Malinowski, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 655 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1966), 1966 WL
88845.
160. Smith, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 1055 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1973), 1973 WL
166689.
161. Washburn, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 148 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1976), 1976 WL
183373.
162. Trumbull, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 245 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1976), 1976 WL
183470.
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B.

Increased Legislative Intervention, but Broad Discretion Remains:
1977–2003

1.

The 1977 Amendments

In 1977, the legislature amended the Act. The amendments codified
some of the Commissioner’s decisions, but also restricted the scope of
administrative and judicial discretion to find good cause under some
circumstances.
In section 2(a), the legislature codified the Commissioner’s decisions
holding that claimants who left work in reliance on a “bona fide job
offer” 163 had good cause. 164 Similarly, in section 2(b),165 the legislature
codified the Commissioner’s framework governing claimants who left
work for medical reasons. 166 Claimants had good cause for leaving work
because of their own illnesses or disabilities, or those of their immediate
family. 167 Section 2(b) generally required claimants to pursue all
reasonable alternatives before leaving work, 168 but the Commissioner
continued to recognize that they did not have to do so when it would
have been futile—for example, when the work that caused the illness
was the only work available to the claimant from the employer. 169
Sections 2(a) and (b) were the first rules that defined good cause. But
the legislature did not abandon the standard-based approach. Instead, in
section 3, the legislature retained the language granting the

163. Act of May 16, 1977, ch. 33, sec. 4, § 73, 1977 Wash. Sess. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 229, 231
(codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE §§ 50.20.050(1)(b)(i), 50.20.050(2)(b)(i) (2012)).
164. See, e.g., Edquist, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 188 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1976),
1976 WL 183413 (holding that claimant had good cause and noting the relevance of her belief that
she had been offered a new job, based on her conversations and interviews with the prospective
employer). Self-employment was not a bona fide job offer. Lewis, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No.
563 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1979), 1979 WL 202705.
165. Act of May 16, 1977, sec. 4, § 73, 1977 Wash. Sess. Laws 1st. Ex. Sess. at 231.
166. Id.; see also supra notes 128–34 and accompanying text.
167. Act of May 16, 1977, sec. 4, § 73, 1977 Wash. Sess. Laws 1st. Ex. Sess. at 231; see also
Frank, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 457 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1978), 1978 WL 209231
(refusing to require a need “to provide constant care” to a family member because the statute did not
require it); Bergman, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 455 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1978), 1978
WL 209229 (discussing the various requirements to establish good cause, including medical
documentation).
168. Act of May 16, 1977, sec. 4, § 73 1977 Wash. Sess. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. at 231.
169. See, e.g., Frasier, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 546 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1979),
1979 WL 202688 (holding that claimant, who suffered a “nervous breakdown” as a result of
teaching “groups of maladjusted students,” had good cause because the employer had no other work
available that “would foreseeably be less stressful and less likely to produce a recurrence of his
illness”).

18 - Toler Comment.docx (Do Not Delete)

2014]

WITHOUT GOOD CAUSE

6/6/2014 12:21 PM

577

Commissioner discretion, 170 but limited that discretion to considering
“other work connected factors.” 171 Section 3 also limited the scope of the
Commissioner’s discretion to find good cause when claimants left work
because of distance. 172
However, section 3 did leave intact the agency’s and the courts’
discretion to find good cause when “other related circumstances would
work an unconscionable hardship on the individual” or when there was a
“substantial involuntary deterioration of the work.” 173 The
Commissioner exercised this discretion by disqualifying claimants for
reasons not specifically enumerated in the statute 174 and by finding good
cause under circumstances not specifically enumerated—as long as the
factors were work-connected. 175
170. Act of May 16, 1977, sec. 4, § 73, 1977 Wash. Sess. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. at 231–32.
171. Id. at 232; see also Lewis, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 563 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t
1979), 1979 WL 202705 (discussing some of the limitations on “good cause” imposed by the 1977
amendments).
172. Act of May 16, 1977, sec 4, § 73, 1977 Wash. Sess. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. at 232 (“Good cause
shall not be established for voluntarily leaving work because of its distance from an individual’s
residence where the distance was known to the individual at the time he or she accepted the
employment . . . .”). Even so, the Commissioner still found good cause in some limited
circumstances. See Hargrove, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 580 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1979),
1979 WL 202722 (when a claimant relied on public transportation and left work because her
assigned shifts would require her to leave work when no public transportation was available), aff’d,
No. 291408 (Wash. Super. Ct. Jan. 30, 1981); Thelbert, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 528
(Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1979), 1979 WL 202671 (when a claimant’s only means of transportation
(a car) developed problems, and he was unable to repair it); Smith, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No.
406 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1978), 1978 WL 209180 (when a claimant was to be transferred from
Tacoma to Seattle and had “no reasonable alternatives to terminating her employment”); Cook,
Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 389 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1978), 1978 WL 209163 (when a
claimant was transferred from Bremerton to Seattle, which would have “require[ed] substantial
commuting costs and additional commuting time by ferry and car”).
173. Act of May 16, 1977, sec. 4, § 73, 1977 Wash. Sess. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. at 232.
174. Hadley, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 553 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1979), 1979 WL
202695 (disqualifying claimant who believed supervisor was incompetent because any
incompetence did not “create[] adverse conditions which a reasonably prudent person could not
abide”); Sprout, Empl. Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d 512 (1979) (disqualifying claimant who was
dissatisfied with supervisor and wanted different work); Mulitauaopele, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec.
2d No. 511 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1979), 1979 WL 202654 (disqualifying claimant who wished
to join the ministry).
175. See, e.g., Alexander, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 638-1 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t
1980), 1980 WL 344316 (holding that claimant who suffered racially motivated harassment had
good cause); Atkinson, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 621 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1980), 1980
WL 344299 (holding that claimant who suffered hazardous working conditions had good cause);
Knutson, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 620 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1980), 1980 WL 344298
(holding that claimant had good cause when her forty-hour-per-week position was reduced to fortyeight hours in a six-week period); Price, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 547 (Wash. Emp’t Sec.
Dep’t 1979), 1979 WL 202689 (holding that claimant facing a pay cut of thirty percent had good
cause); Ritter, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 510 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1979), 1979 WL
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Finally, the legislature added section 4, which disqualified claimants
“whose marital status or domestic responsibilities caused [them] to leave
employment.” 176 This rule disqualified many claimants who might well
have qualified under the previous standard. For example, section 4
disqualified claimants who:
• left work “due to marital difficulties and to follow his wife to
Oregon”; 177
• left work because it “required long absences away from her
home, which was disquieting to her husband, and rendered it
impossible for her to properly care for their daughter”; 178
• left work because her mother died; 179
• received one day’s notice that she had to pick up her new
adopted child, and left work to care for the baby after her
requests for leave were refused; 180
• left work, as a single father of four, to provide guidance for
his children, some of whom had experienced trouble in school
or been arrested; 181
• had joint custody of her children—at least one of whom was
“having emotional problems because of the separation from
her mother”—and left work to be closer to them; 182
• moved because her ex-husband, against whom she had filed
assault charges, had repeatedly threatened her and her
children; 183 and
202653 (holding that claimant who left work after his supervisor “made slanderous statements about
him and impugned his honesty” by falsely accusing him of stealing tools had good cause); Norris,
Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 439 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1978), 1978 WL 209213 (holding
that claimant who suffered sex discrimination had good cause); Groulx, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec.
2d No. 431 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1978), 1978 WL 209205 (holding that an employer’s “fail[ure]
to fulfull [sic] the terms of the contract of hire” was good cause).
176. Act of May 16, 1977, sec. 4, § 73, 1977 Wash. Sess. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. at 232.
177. Dwyer, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 411 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1978), 1978 WL
209185.
178. Alex, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 416 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1978), 1978 WL
209190.
179. Smith, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 487 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1979), 1979 WL
202630.
180. Rhoades, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 552 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1979), 1979 WL
202694.
181. Pierpont, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 573 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1979), 1979 WL
202715.
182. Cox, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 614 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1980), 1980 WL
344292.
183. Hopkins, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 648 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1980), 1980 WL
344326, dismissed, No. 22710 (Wash. Super. Ct. Apr. 9, 1982).
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•

left work to follow her husband, who was employed outside
her labor market. 184
However, despite section 4, the Courts of Appeals decided that the
1977 amendments did not abrogate the prior definition of good cause.185
In 1980, in Coleman v. Department of Employment Security, 186 Division
One of the Court of Appeals observed that the amendment limiting
discretion to work-connected factors had no effect because “the key
operative words” in the statute remained the same. 187 Therefore, the
court held that a claimant who left work after a co-worker assaulted her
had a compelling personal reason and was not disqualified. 188
The next year, in Vergeyle v. Employment Security Department, 189 the
same court held that a claimant who left work in response to “the
unreasonable conduct of the employer” had good cause. 190 The court
cited Coleman and explained that, “Washington case law has long
recognized that good cause for leaving employment is not limited to
work-connected factors . . . . This court recently held that the judicial
definition of good cause was not abrogated by the [1977] amendments to
the statute.” 191
Division Three of the Court of Appeals agreed. In Yamauchi v.
Department of Employment Security, 192 the court determined that a
claimant who left work to marry her fiancé was disqualified—not
because of section 4, but because she was not married when she left
work. 193 The court noted that the judicial definition of good cause
included compelling personal reasons, 194 then explained that, in its view,
“[Section 4] was enacted by the legislature . . . to clarify compelling
personal reasons which would qualify as good cause for voluntary
184. Cournyer, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 651 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1980), 1980 WL
344329.
185. See Vergeyle v. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 28 Wash. App. 399, 623 P.2d 736 (1981), review
denied, 95 Wash. 2d 1021 (1981); Yamauchi v. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 28 Wash. App 427, 624 P.2d
197 (1981), rev’d, 96 Wash. 2d 773, 638 P.2d 1253 (1982); Coleman v. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 25
Wash. App. 405, 607 P.2d 1231 (1980).
186. 25 Wash. App. 405, 607 P.2d 1231.
187. Id. at 409 nn.1–2, 607 P.2d at 1233 nn.1–2.
188. Id. at 409–10, 607 P.2d at 1233–34.
189. 28 Wash. App. 399, 623 P.2d 736.
190. Id. at 404, 623 P.2d at 739.
191. Id. at 403, 623 P.2d at 739 (emphasis added) (citing Coleman, 25 Wash. App. 405, 607 P.2d
1231).
192. 28 Wash. App 427, 624 P.2d 197 (1981), rev’d, 96 Wash. 2d 773, 638 P.2d 1253 (1982).
193. Id. at 432–34, 624 P.2d at 199–201.
194. Id. at 430–31, 624 P.2d at 199.
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termination of employment.” 195 The court reasoned that, because “[t]he
legislature is presumed to have in mind decisions of our Supreme Court
when enacting statutes,” the 1977 amendments did not abrogate the prior
definition of good cause. 196
Although the Washington State Supreme Court declined to review
Vergeyle, 197 it waded into the fray after Yamauchi. 198 The Court
reversed, in part because the Court of Appeals erred in holding that
section 4 “must be read in light of prior judicial decisions.” 199 The Court
rejected the Court of Appeals’ characterization of the 1977 amendments:
Section 4 . . . does not “clarify” good cause; it is an exception to
good cause. The new statute is markedly different from its
predecessor. It confines good cause to sections 1 through
3 . . . . By creating [section 4] the legislature provided for
different treatment of persons who voluntarily leave work for
reasons of “marital status or domestic responsibilities”, such as
the circumstances presented in Bale and Ayers that were
previously treated as good cause cases.200
Importantly, the Court’s decision in Yamauchi acknowledged that the
1977 amendments had limited the scope of good cause. 201
2.

The 1980 Amendments

In 1980, the legislature amended the statute again. The legislature
amended section 2(b), which already provided that claimants had good
cause for leaving work because of illness or disability, or that of an
immediate family member, 202 to provide that the death of an immediate
family member also established good cause. 203 The legislature also
amended the second part of section 2(b), which required claimants to try
to preserve a job before quitting because of illness or disability, 204 to
provide that they did not have to do so if it would have been futile. 205
195. Id. at 432, 624 P.2d at 200.
196. Id.
197. 95 Wash. 2d 1021 (1981).
198. 95 Wash. 2d 1026 (1981) (order granting review).
199. Yamauchi v. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec, 96 Wash. 2d 773,773, 776, 638 P.2d 1253, 1254 (1982).
200. Id. at 776–77, 638 P.2d at 1255 (footnote omitted).
201. See id.
202. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(2)(b) (1979).
203. Act of Mar. 6, 1980, ch. 74, sec. 5, § 73, 1980 Wash. Sess. Laws 170, 174 (codified as
amended at WASH. REV. CODE §§ 50.20.050(1)(b)(ii), 50.20.050(2)(b)(ii) (2012)).
204. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(2)(b) (1979).
205. Act of Mar. 6, 1980, sec. 5, § 73, 1980 Wash. Sess. Laws at 174 (codified as amended at
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The 1980 amendments also modified the “quit-due-to-distance”
provision. 206 Once again, the legislature restricted the scope of good
cause: claimants had to show that “the distance [was not] customarily
traveled by workers” 207 in similar occupations.
Finally, the amendments directed the Commissioner to determine not
whether a work-connected factor leading a claimant to quit was an
“unconscionable” hardship, 208 but whether the hardship was
“unreasonable.” 209
3.

The 1981–1982 Amendments

The 1981 amendments continued this trend of limiting discretion.
Although the Act already specified that claimants had good cause if they
left work “to accept a bona fide job offer,” 210 the amendments added a
list of factors the Commissioner was to consider in determining whether
a job offer was in fact bona fide. 211
The next year, in 1982, the legislature further circumscribed the
definition of good cause. Before the 1982 amendments, section 3
directed the Commissioner to “consider the degree of risk involved to
the individual’s health, safety, and morals, the individual’s physical
fitness, the individual’s ability to perform the work, and such other work
connected factors as the commissioner may deem pertinent.” 212 The
1982 amendments, however, directed the Commissioner to “only

WASH. REV. CODE §§ 50.20.050(1)(b)(ii)(A), 50.20.050(2)(b)(ii)(A) (2012)); see also Christie,
Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 262 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1976), 1976 WL 183487 (discussing
the futility exception).
206. Act of Mar. 6, 1980, sec. 5, § 73, 1980 Wash. Sess. Laws at 174.
207. Act of Mar. 6, 1980, sec. 5, § 73, 1980 Wash. Sess. Laws at 174.
208. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(3) (1979).
209. Act of Mar. 6, 1980, sec. 5, § 73, 1980 Wash. Sess. Laws at 175. The Commissioner found
unreasonable hardship when, for example, a claimant was required to “perform additional duties
without pay,” Wright, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 814 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1990), 1990
WL 10049283; when a claimant’s customary work in Bremerton was transferred to Texas, Wheat,
Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 665 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1981), 1981 WL 394831; and when
a claimant was required to do the work of two employees, Vickers, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No.
657 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1981), 1981 WL 394823.
210. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(2)(a) (Supp. 1980).
211. Act of Apr. 20, 1981, ch. 35, sec. 4, § 73, 1981 Wash. Sess. Laws 132, 135–36 (codified as
amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(1)(a) (2012)) (directing the commissioner to consider
factors including “the duration of the work,” “the extent of direction and control by the employer
over the work,” and “the level of skill required for the work in light of the individual’s training and
experience” when determining whether a job offer was bona fide). The new work could not be “a
mere sham to qualify for benefits.” Id. at 135.
212. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(3) (1981).
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consider work-connected factors.” 213 This amendment made it clear that
only work-connected factors could establish good cause. 214
4.

The 1993, 2000, and 2002 Amendments

Between 1977 and 1993, the legislature struggled to decide whether
claimants who left work because of their spouse’s employment had good
cause. 215 In 1993, the legislature amended the statute to provide that
leaving work to move for a spouse’s employment is good cause. 216
However, the 2000 amendments restricted the scope of that “quit-tofollow” rule and provided that claimants who quit to follow a spouse
could only establish good cause if “the spouse’s employment [was] due
to an employer-initiated mandatory transfer.” 217
Unlike the 2000 amendments, the 2002 amendments expanded the
scope of circumstances that could constitute good cause. 218 The
legislature added a new section providing that claimants who left work
to protect themselves or their families “from domestic violence . . . or
stalking” had good cause. 219
5.

Conclusions

The voluntary quit statute evolved significantly from the open-ended
1937 standard to the more rule-based approach that existed in 2000.
Although a few of the amendments to the statute expanded the scope of
administrative and judicial discretion, most narrowed it, as the
legislature increasingly codified good cause. That trend culminated in
2003, when the legislature enacted, for the first time, an enumerated list
213. Act of Apr. 2, 1982, ch. 18, sec. 6, § 73, 1982 Wash. Sess. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 1090, 1096
(emphasis added) (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(3) (Supp. 1982)).
214. See Davis v. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 108 Wash. 2d 272, 276, 737 P.2d 1262, 1265 (1987).
215. Compare Cournyer, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 651 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1980),
1980 WL 344329 (no good cause), with Ayers v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t, 85 Wash. 2d 550, 536 P.2d 610
(1975) (good cause).
216. Act of May 17, 1993, ch. 483, § 8, 1993 Wash. Sess. Laws 2017, 2022 (codified as amended
at WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(2)(b)(iii) (2012)). The amendment established three
requirements: the claimant must have left work “to relocate for the spouse’s employment”; the
spouse’s employment must have been “outside the existing labor market area”; and the claimant
must have “remained employed as long as was reasonable prior to the move.” Id.
217. Act of Feb. 7, 2000, ch. 2, sec. 12, § 8, 2000 Wash. Sess. Laws 4, 16 (codified as amended at
WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(1)(b)(iii)) (requiring that the claimant’s spouse be relocated because
of a “mandatory military transfer”).
218. Act of Mar. 12, 2002, ch. 8, sec. 1, § 12, 2002 Wash. Sess. Laws 32, 33 (codified at WASH.
REV. CODE §§ 50.20.050(1)(b)(iv), 50.20.050(2)(b)(iv)).
219. Id.
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of good cause reasons.
C.

The Ascendance, Demise, and Resurrection of the Rule: 2003–
Present

By the early 2000s, the good cause framework was well established:
To have good cause for severing employment so as to be eligible
for benefits, an employee must leave work primarily because of
work-connected factors of such compelling nature as to cause a
reasonably prudent person to leave, after exhausting all
reasonable, non-futile alternatives. The commissioner must
consider only work-related factors brought about by the
employer. 220
However, in 2003, the legislature enacted a major revision to the
Employment Security Act. 221 As part of an effort to keep major
employers in Washington, 222 the legislature passed a bill that altered
many important provisions of the Act: it removed the “liberal
construction” language from the preamble, 223 codified (for the first time)
a largely rule-based definition of disqualifying misconduct, 224 and (also
for the first time) removed the language granting the Commissioner
discretion to find good cause. 225 Instead, the legislature replaced that
language with an enumerated list of reasons that could constitute good
cause. 226 The new statute specified just ten reasons that would constitute
good cause for leaving work:
1. to “accept a bona fide offer of bona fide work”; 227
2. “because of the illness or disability of the claimant or the
death, illness, or disability of a member of the claimant’s
immediate family”; 228
220. Emps. of Intalco Aluminum Corp. v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t, 128 Wash. App. 121, 130, 114 P.3d
675, 680 (2005).
221. Act of June 20, 2003, ch. 4, 2003 Wash. Sess. Laws 2d Spec. Sess. 2782 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of WASH. REV. CODE §§ 50.01.05–50.98.110 (2012)).
222. For an overview of the political context surrounding the 2003 amendments—particularly
Boeing’s involvement in and effect on the legislation—see Deborah Maranville, Unemployment
Insurance Meets Globalization and the Modern Workforce, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1129, 1139–
46 (2004).
223. Act of June 20, 2003, sec. 1, § 2, 2003 Wash. Sess. Laws 2d Spec. Sess. at 2782–83.
224. Id. sec. 5, § 1, at 2787; id. sec. 6, at 2787–88.
225. Id. sec. 4, § 1 at 2784–87.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 2786 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(2)(b)(i) (2012)).
228. Id. (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(2)(b)(ii)). Claimants still had to “pursue[] all
reasonable alternatives to preserve his or her employment status . . . [unless that] would have been a
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3. “to relocate for the spouse’s employment . . . due to a
mandatory military transfer”; 229
4. “to protect the claimant or the claimant’s immediate family
members from domestic violence . . . or stalking”; 230
5. because of a reduction in usual compensation of at least
25%; 231
6. because of a reduction in usual hours of at least 25%; 232
7. because of a change in worksite that “caused a material
increase in distance or difficulty of travel”; 233
8. because the “worksite safety deteriorated”; 234
9. because of “illegal activities in the . . . worksite”; 235 and
10. because the usual work “was changed to work that violates
the individual’s religious convictions or sincere moral
beliefs.” 236
The revised statute did not, however, state whether the new list was the
exclusive list of reasons that could establish good cause.237 After these
amendments, the Commissioner declined to decide whether the agency
or the courts retained any discretion to find good cause for other
reasons. 238 And, as two cases 239 wound their way through the agency and
the courts, it became clear that the courts were also unsure.

futile act.” Id.
229. Id. (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(2)(b)(iii)).
230. Act of June 20, 2003, sec. 4, § 1, 2003 Wash. Sess. Laws 2d Spec. Sess. at 2786 (codified at
WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(2)(b)(iv)).
231. Id. (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(2)(b)(v)).
232. Id. (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(2)(b)(vi)).
233. Id. (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(2)(b)(vii)). This subsection also required that
the post-change “commute was greater than is customary for workers in the individual’s job
classification and labor market.” Id.
234. Id. (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(2)(b)(viii)). The subsection required that the
claimant “reported such safety deterioration to the employer, and the employer failed to correct the
hazards within a reasonable period of time.” Id.
235. Id. (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(2)(b)(ix)). This subsection also required that
the claimant “reported such activities to the employer, and the employer failed to end such activities
within a reasonable period of time.” Id.
236. Id. at 2787 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(2)(b)(x)).
237. See id.
238. See Krimbel, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 904 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 2005), 2005
WL 5438407 (holding that claimant had good cause because she left work for medical reasons, but
declining to explain whether the ten reasons were exclusive).
239. Spain v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t, 164 Wash. 2d 252, 185 P.3d 1188 (2008); Starr v. Emp’t Sec.
Dep’t, 130 Wash. App. 541, 123 P.3d 513 (2005), review denied, 157 Wash. 2d 1019, 142 P.3d 607
(2006), overruled by Spain, 164 Wash. 2d 252, 185 P.3d 1188.
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Starr Sounds the Death Knell of Discretion

The courts first grappled with the 2003 amendments in 2005, when
Division Two of the Court of Appeals decided Starr v. Employment
Security Department. 240 The court confronted an important question:
whether the amended statute’s “list of non-disqualifying reasons for
voluntarily leaving employment” was exclusive, or whether the
Commissioner retained any discretion to find good cause for another
reason. 241
In July 2003, Dennis Starr left his job to go to Alaska, where his
daughters and grandchildren lived. 242 One of his daughters had been in a
“serious car accident” and was incarcerated; the other had been arrested
and imprisoned for allegedly murdering her children’s father. 243 Starr
and his wife went to Alaska to take custody of their grandchildren. 244
When Starr filed his claim for unemployment benefits, the agency
found he lacked good cause and disqualified him. 245 As his case
proceeded through the courts, his benefits were consistently denied
because he left work for a reason not specifically listed in the statute. 246
When his case reached the Court of Appeals, the court affirmed and held
that the amended statute “provides the exclusive list of good cause
reasons for voluntarily quitting employment that will not disqualify a
claimant from receiving unemployment compensation benefits.” 247
The Washington State Supreme Court denied Starr’s petition for
review. 248 Therefore, after Starr, claimants had good cause for leaving
work only when they left for one of the ten reasons listed in the
statute. 249
2.

Spain Revives the Possibility of Discretion

While Dennis Starr’s case was pending, another case presenting the
same question—whether the statute provided an exclusive list of good
240. Starr, 130 Wash. App. 541, 123 P.3d 513.
241. Id. at 542–43, 123 P.3d at 515.
242. Id. at 543, 123 P.3d at 515.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 543–44, 123 P.3d at 515.
246. Id. at 544, 123 P.3d at 515.
247. Id. at 551, 123 P.3d at 519.
248. Starr v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t, 157 Wash. 2d 1019, 142 P.3d 607 (2006) (order denying review).
249. See Grater v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t, 137 Wash. App. 1013 (2007) (unpublished) (citing Starr,
130 Wash. App. at 546, 123 P.3d at 519).
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cause reasons—was proceeding through the courts. 250
Sara Spain quit her job in June 2004 because she “found [her
employer] unbearable.” 251 Her employer scolded her for “being too
slow”; 252 her employer subjected her and her co-workers to “verbal
abuse . . . on a daily basis” 253 (abuse which included profanity and being
called “retards” 254); and her employer would “kick [shelves] and throw
things,” 255 including boxes of nails and tools. 256 On one occasion,
dissatisfied with work her co-workers had performed, the employer
forced Spain and her co-workers to stand outside “in the freezing cold
for [about] three hours while he” berated them, telling them he “[hoped]
it does rain so you guys can get soaked and miserable” and that he
“[didn’t] give a shit . . . how you guys feel.” 257
The agency denied Spain benefits. 258 However, the superior court
reversed, holding that the list of reasons was not exclusive and that
Spain had good cause. 259 The agency appealed to Division Two of the
Court of Appeals—the same court that, less than two years earlier,
decided Starr. 260 The court, citing Starr, reversed. 261 Spain filed a
petition for review in the Washington State Supreme Court, 262 which the
Court granted. 263
250. See Spain v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t, 162 Wash. 2d 1010, 178 P.3d 936 (2008) (order granting
review).
251. Id. at 255, 185 P.3d at 1189.
252. Brief of Respondent at 4, Spain, 164 Wash. 2d 252, 185 P.3d 1188 (No. 79878-8). Although
Spain was the petitioner in the Washington State Supreme Court, she was the respondent in the
Court of Appeals. The same briefs were filed in both cases, and the party designations were not
changed on the briefs. See id. at i.
253. Id. at 2.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 3.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 3.
258. Spain v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t, 137 Wash. App. 1005, 1005 (2007) (unpublished), rev’d, Spain,
164 Wash. 2d 252, 185 P.3d 1188 (2008).
259. Id.
260. Starr v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t, 130 Wash. App. 541, 123 P.3d 513 (2005), review denied, 157
Wash. 2d 1019, 142 P.3d 607 (2006), overruled by Spain, 164 Wash. 2d 252, 185 P.3d 1188.
261. Id.
262. See Spain v. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 162 Wash. 2d 1010, 178 P.3d 936 (2008) (order granting
review).
263. Id. Spain was consolidated with another case, Batey v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t, 137 Wash. App.
506, 154 P.3d 266 (2007), aff’d on other grounds sub nom. Spain, 164 Wash. 2d 252, 185 P.3d
1188. Kusum Batey was another claimant denied unemployment benefits; she challenged the
constitutionality of the 2006 amendments under Washington’s “subject-in-title” requirement. See
WASH. CONST. art. II, § 19.
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Before the Court, the ESD argued that the 2003 amendments
“removed discretion to determine good cause on a case-by-case basis”
and that “[t]he Legislature established, in place of discretion, a discrete
list of criteria that constitute good cause.” 264 Spain argued that the list of
good cause reasons in previous statutes had never been considered an
exclusive list, so the new list should not be considered exclusive,
either. 265 Spain also emphasized the legislature’s mandate that the Act be
given a liberal construction, 266 arguing that “[r]eading the statute as
permitting ten and only ten good causes for quitting one’s job is just the
sort of pinched reading the legislature” 267 had rejected in the past. 268
The Court unanimously agreed with Spain. Noting that the “statute is
not a model of clarity,” 269 the Court observed that the plain language did
not limit the qualifying reasons to those enumerated in the statute. 270 The
Court also rejected allegations about the legislature’s purpose 271 and
found support for both positions in the legislative history. 272 Ultimately,
the decision turned on the plain language of the statute: the legislature
simply did not make the list of reasons exclusive 273—which, as the
Court noted, would have been quite easy. 274
The decision overruled Starr and authorized the agency and the courts
to continue exercising what little discretion they retained after the 2003
amendments. But the legislature disagreed, and the next year, it revisited
the disqualification statute.
3.

The Legislature Strikes Back: The Abrogation of Spain
The Washington State Supreme Court issued its decision in Spain on

264. Appellant’s Brief at 6, Spain, 164 Wash. 2d 252, 185 P.3d 1188 (No. 79878-8).
265. Brief of Respondent, supra note 256, at 18.
266. Id. at 22–25.
267. Id. at 22–23.
268. See Act of Apr. 22, 2005, ch. 133, sec. 2, § 1, 2005 Wash. Sess. Laws 376, 377 (codified at
WASH. REV. CODE § 50.01.010 (2012)) (restoring the mandate that the statute be “liberally
construed”).
269. Spain, 164 Wash. 2d at 257, 185 P.3d at 1190.
270. Id. at 257–59, 185 P.3d at 1190–91.
271. Id. at 259, 185 P.3d at 1191 (rejecting the assertion “that the statutory list was intended to be
exclusive and that exclusivity was the finishing stroke of a multi-year public policy compromise
between business and labor over the nature of the Unemployment Insurance system” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
272. Id. at 259, 185 P.3d at 1191–92.
273. Id. at 258–60, 185 P.3d at 1191–92.
274. Id. at 259, 185 P.3d at 1191.
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June 19, 2008. 275 Less than three months later, Lehman Brothers
collapsed and ushered in the global financial crisis of 2008. 276 As the
crisis unfolded, a series of other major banks imploded, and global
“markets ground to a terrifying halt.” 277 Unemployment also
skyrocketed. 278 In Washington, the unemployment rate rose almost 2%,
from 5.1% to 7.0%, in the last three months of 2008 alone. 279 Through
2009, the unemployment rate continued to rise: it hovered around 9% for
most of the year, but by December 2009, it had reached 10.3%. 280
Despite these catastrophic effects, the legislature’s agenda for 2009
included a bill to abrogate Spain and remove the last vestiges of
discretion. 281
In February 2009, thirteen state senators introduced Senate Bill
5963. 282 The bill, among other things, 283 proposed an amendment to the
voluntary quit statute. 284 This amendment would specify that the reasons
enumerated in the statute were the only reasons that could constitute
good cause for leaving work. 285
Both the House Committee on Commerce & Labor and the Senate
Committee on Labor, Commerce & Consumer Protection held public
hearings on the proposed legislation. 286 The business community argued

275. Id. at 252, 185 P.3d at 1188.
276. See, e.g., Thomas Ferguson & Robert Johnson, Too Big to Bail: The “Paulson Put,”
Presidential Politics, and the Global Financial Meltdown: Part I: From Shadow Financial System
to Shadow Bailout, 38 INT’L J. POL. ECON. 3, 4 (2009).
277. Id.
278. See, e.g., James Marschall Borbely, U.S. Labor Market in 2008: Economy in Recession,
MONTHLY LAB. REV., March 2009, at 3–4.
279. Local Area Unemployment Statistics, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://data.bls.gov/cgibin/dsrv?la (select “Washington” and click “Next form”; then select “Statewide” and click “Next
form”; select “Washington” and click “Next form”; select “unemployment rate” and click “Next
form”; select “Not Seasonally Adjusted” and click “Next form”; then click “Retrieve data”) (last
visited at Apr. 30, 2014).
280. Id.
281. See Substitute S.B. 5963, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2009). Its companion bill was House
Bill 2204. See H.B. 2204, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2009).
282. Substitute S.B. 5963.
283. The bill also aimed to bring Washington law into conformity with federal requirements, to
modify how employers’ unemployment insurance taxes are charged, and to modify the quit-tofollow provision to allow a claimants to establish good cause if they quit because of a spouse or
domestic partner’s work outside their labor market area. See id.
284. Id. (“Good cause reasons to leave work are limited to reasons listed in (b) of this
subsection.”).
285. See id.
286. See An Act Relating to Unemployment Insurance: Hearing on S.B. 5963 Before the S.
Comm. on Labor, Commerce & Consumer Protection, 61st Leg. Sess. (Wash. 2009),
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that the bill would simply “recodif[y] the agreement that was made in
2003 and has been thrown out by the courts,” 287 while worker advocates
explained that, because of the sheer variety of circumstances that lead
people to leave work, the agency and the courts needed discretion to find
good cause for reasons not enumerated in the statute. 288
Notwithstanding those advocates’ concerns, the legislature passed the
bill on April 26, 2009. 289 Since the law took effect on September 6,
2009, Washington workers can only establish good cause for voluntarily
leaving work for the eleven reasons listed in the statute 290—no matter
how compelling the circumstances, no matter how unreasonable the
hardship.
IV. WASHINGTON SHOULD RETURN TO A STANDARDBASED APPROACH TO DETERMINE GOOD CAUSE FOR
LEAVING WORK
This Comment argues that Washington should adopt a standard-based
approach to finding good cause for leaving work. This Part advances
three arguments: (A) in the context of work and of Washington’s
unemployment compensation laws, a standard is more theoretically
sound; (B) the rule has disqualified workers who left work for reasons
consistent with the Employment Security Act; and (C) a standard is
necessary to give effect to the purpose of the Act and of unemployment
compensation generally.
A.

In the Context of Work and Unemployment Compensation, a
Standard Is More Theoretically Sound than a Rule

As Part II explained, rules are better suited to governing homogenous,
repetitive behavior with little variation.291 By contrast, standards are
better suited to governing circumstances that vary significantly and
http://www.tvw.org/index.php?option=com_tvwplayer&eventID=2009021169.
287. See, e.g., id. (statement of Trent House, State Manager of Government Relations for the
Boeing Company).
288. See, e.g., id. (statements of Pam Crone, Northwest Women’s Law Center, and Bob Abbott,
Washington and Northern Idaho District Council of Laborers).
289. Substitute S.B. 5963, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2009), Act of May 14, 2009, ch. 493,
2009 Wash. Sess. Laws 2622 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050 (2012)).
290. See WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(2)(b). Although the 2003 amendments specified just ten
reasons that constitute good cause, the legislature added an eleventh reason—leaving work to enroll
in an approved training program—in 2008. Act of April 1, 2008, ch. 323, sec. 1, § 2, 2008 Wash.
Sess. Laws 1690, 1693 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(2)(b)(xi)).
291. See supra Part II.A.
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cannot often or reliably be anticipated in advance.292 Because
employment relationships (and the reasons they end) vary significantly,
the agency and the courts can make fair decisions about good cause only
if they can make individualized, fact-specific determinations.
Additionally, because the usual rationales for rules do not justify their
use in Washington’s unemployment compensation system, a standard is
more theoretically sound in this context.
1.

Workers’ Reasons for Leaving Work Vary Significantly and
Require Individualized, Fact-Specific Determinations

As any worker can attest, every job is different—and workers’
reasons for leaving a job vary significantly. For example, in just two
years, the Commissioner confronted a variety of reasons leading
claimants to leave work: 293
• quitting as a term of an agreement settling the claimant’s
lawsuit against the employer, alleging harassment,
discrimination, retaliation, and wrongful termination; 294
• quitting to follow a spouse, a certified Swiss watchmaker, to
Montana, where he would be the only certified Swiss
watchmaker; 295
• quitting after the employer failed to provide a paycheck,
despite the claimant’s repeated requests; 296
• quitting to move from Massachusetts to join a new spouse
who was employed in Bremerton; 297
• quitting to move to Phoenix to support and protect a daughter
who was having legal problems and who was being abused by
her boyfriend; 298 and
292. See supra Part II.A.
293. These examples are from Commissioner’s Decisions published in 2010 and 2011. However,
in these two years, the Commissioner received 2,618 appeals in voluntary quit cases—each of
which undoubtedly presented its own unique circumstances. E-mail from Robert Page, Public
Records Officer, Wash. State Emp’t Sec. Dep’t, to author (Mar. 13, 2013, 4:46 PM PDT) (on file
with author) [hereinafter E-MAIL FROM ROBERT PAGE].
294. McPherson, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 978 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 2011), 2011 WL
8129813.
295. Mapelli, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 975 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 2011), 2011 WL
8129812.
296. Lauzon, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 958 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 2010), 2010 WL
6795724.
297. Gray, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 955 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 2010), 2010 WL
6795721.
298. Rivera, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 959 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 2010), 2010 WL
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quitting because an employer required the claimant to begin
purchasing his own work supplies, which he could not
afford. 299
The cases discussed in Part III 300 also demonstrate that a person may
leave work for an almost endless list of reasons.
Determining whether those reasons constitute good cause is
necessarily fact-intensive and case-specific. Recognizing this reality,
before the 2003 amendments, neither the agency nor the courts had ever
applied a rule to determine whether good cause existed. 301 Instead, they
recognized that such determinations could only be fairly resolved by
applying standards. 302 As the Washington State Supreme Court
explained, “Good cause . . . is not susceptible of an exact definition.
Rather, the meaning of these words must be determined in each case
from the facts of that case.” 303 That rationale is still justified today.
Employment relationships and job separations are every bit as varied as
they were when the agency and the courts were free to exercise
discretion to find good cause. The rule, which eliminates that discretion,
is not theoretically sound.
Moreover, because rules cannot respond effectively to individual
cases, the rule-based statute threatens claimants’ due process rights.
Every claimant is already entitled to a hearing to explain how the law
should apply to the facts of his or her case. 304 But that modicum of
procedural justice does not adequately protect a claimant’s right to due
process. 305 Instead, there is another concept that animates due process:
people should be allowed not merely to test the application of
law to fact, but also to urge that their case is different from those
that have gone before, and that someone in a position of
6795725.
299. Eichelberg, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 946 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 2010), 2010 WL
6795712.
300. See supra Part III.
301. See, e.g., Matison v. Hutt, 85 Wash. 2d 836, 839, 539 P.2d 852, 854 (1975) (refusing to
apply a rule to determine good cause, noting that “[s]uch inflexibility would be unreasonable” and
lead to unfair anomalies).
302. See, e.g., Nielsen v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t, 93 Wash. App. 21, 42, 966 P.2d 399, 409 (1998)
(“The proper test is what a reasonably prudent person would do in similar circumstances.”); Hussa
v. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 34 Wash. App. 857, 863, 664 P.2d 1286, 1289–90 (1983) (“Generally, good
cause for leaving employment requires a person meet the test of what an ordinarily prudent person
would have done under the circumstances.”).
303. Matison, 85 Wash. 2d at 838–39, 539 P.2d at 853–54 (quoting Saulls v. Emp’t Sec. Agency,
377 P.2d 789, 793 (Idaho 1963)).
304. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.32.020 (2012).
305. See Sunstein, supra note 57, at 995.
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authority ought to be required to pay heed to the particulars of
their situation. 306
The United States Supreme Court recognized this concept in its
“irrebuttable presumption doctrine,” which the Court applied to prohibit
legislative classifications that are over- or under-inclusive, unless the
affected group has the opportunity to rebut the presumption that it is
actually within the scope of the classification. 307 The Court relied, at
least in part, on that doctrine to invalidate a variety of statutes that
denied people the opportunity to explain that they were not properly
encompassed by the rules that had been applied to them. 308 For example,
a state could not categorically deny unwed fathers custody of their
children without providing them an opportunity to explain that, despite
the rule presuming they were unfit parents, they were—in their
individual cases—capable of parenting. 309 In the context of the voluntary
quit statute, this understanding of due process requires that claimants
have the opportunity to argue that, even if their reasons for leaving work
are not expressly contemplated by the rule, those reasons nevertheless
constitute good cause—that the rule, as applied to them, is unfairly
under-inclusive. 310
This Comment does not argue that Washington’s current rule-based
statute is unconstitutional. 311 However, the concept of due process
reflected by the irrebuttable presumption doctrine does suggest that,
when people are governed by rigid rules, they have an important interest
in proving that those rules do not adequately address their situations. The
306. Id. at 996.
307. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269, 285–
89 (1975).
308. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 647–48 (1974) (holding
unconstitutional administrative regulations that automatically prohibited teachers from working
after a fixed month of pregnancy); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542–43 (1971) (holding
unconstitutional a statute that automatically suspended a driver’s license after an accident without
giving the driver the opportunity to prove he was not at fault); Tribe, supra note 307, at 285 n.49
(collecting cases).
309. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656–58 (1972).
310. The fact that claimants have the right to a hearing, see WASH. REV. CODE § 50.32.020
(2012), is not enough. To protect claimants’ due process rights, hearing officers and other
adjudicators must have the authority to find that claimants’ circumstances constitute good cause—
authority the current rule precludes. See id. § 50.20.050(2)(a) (“Good cause reasons to leave work
are limited to reasons listed in (b) of this subsection.”).
311. The Court has declined to extend the irrebuttable presumption doctrine. See Weinberger v.
Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 768–74 (1975) (distinguishing the previous cases relying on the doctrine and
questioning its applicability); Sunstein, supra note 57, at 996 n.156 (noting the doctrine was “shortlived”). However, the cases relying on the doctrine have not been overruled. See Weinberger, 422
U.S. at 768–74 (distinguishing, but not overruling, cases).
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current rule precludes any decision-maker from vindicating that
interest. 312 Particularly in the context of unemployment compensation,
where individual circumstances vary wildly and the need for benefits is
often acute, it is theoretically unsound and fundamentally unfair to deny
claimants the right to a truly individualized adjudication.
2.

Many of the Usual Rationales for Rules Do Not Justify Their Use
in Washington’s Voluntary Quit Statute

Defenders of rules invoke many rationales. Some of these rationales
are that rules minimize the cost of making decisions in individual
cases, 313 have “simplifying effects,” 314 and reduce the likelihood of
arbitrary or biased decision-making. 315 However, the current rule-based
approach to good cause does not advance those purposes; instead, it is
often at odds with them.
First, the rule does not minimize costs. One reason rules may limit
costs in some contexts is that they reduce the need to “compil[e]
information.” 316 But that rationale is inapplicable in the context of
Washington’s unemployment compensation system. Every time a
claimant files for unemployment benefits after quitting a job, the ESD
must determine whether he or she had good cause. 317 The ESD must
offer both the claimant and the employer the opportunity to be
interviewed about the job separation. 318 That was true before the 2003
amendments, 319 and it remains true now. 320 The rule did not reduce the
costs of compiling information.
Second, if a rule actually has “simplifying effects,” 321 it will
presumably reduce the need for extensive adjudication. 322 But the
current rule does not reduce that need. Aggrieved parties, whether
claimants or employers, are entitled to appeal every level of agency

312. See WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(2)(a) (“Good cause reasons to leave work are limited to
reasons listed in (b) of this subsection.”).
313. Kaplow, supra note 67, at 570; Sunstein, supra note 57, at 972–74.
314. Sunstein, supra note 57, at 972.
315. Id. at 974–75.
316. Id. at 973.
317. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 192-120-030 (2004).
318. Id. § 192-130-080 (2010); id. §§ 192-120-030, -040 (2004).
319. See id. §§ 192-120-030, -040 (2001).
320. See id. § 192-130-080 (2010); Id. §§ 192-120-030, -040 (2004).
321. Sunstein, supra note 57, at 972.
322. See id. at 973.
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decision about whether a claimant has good cause for leaving work. 323
The rule has not reduced the need for the Commissioner to review
appeals in voluntary quit cases. Data from the ESD show that roughly
the same percentage of appeals were filed before and after the 2003
amendments: 324
Year

2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

Total number
of voluntary
quit claims
35,099
46,721
53,915
50,276
46,384
41,850
41,162
41,456
43,606
52,821
55,818
44,798
40,119

Voluntary quit
appeals to
Commissioner
535
901
1340
1203
1095
944
792
711
587
1065
1486
1132
977

Percentage of
claims appealed
1.52%
1.93%
2.49%
2.39%
2.36%
2.26%
1.92%
1.72%
1.35%
2.02%
2.66%
2.53%
2.44%

Although there was a slight reduction in appeals after the 2003
amendments, any such reduction disappeared by 2009. 325 If the rule
actually provided clarity, as proponents of rules suggest, it would have
reduced the need for appeals. 326 These data show that it did not.
Third, the rule does not inherently reduce the risk of arbitrary or
biased decision-making. Instead, by requiring the agency and the courts
to focus on just eleven reasons that can constitute good cause, the rule
requires them to ignore other factors that would prompt a reasonable
person to leave work. That is, the rule “make[s] irrelevant features of
cases that might turn out, on reflection by people making particular
judgments, to be relevant indeed.” 327 By prohibiting the agency and the
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.

WASH. REV. CODE § 50.32.020 (2012).
E-MAIL FROM ROBERT PAGE, supra note 293.
Id.
See Sunstein, supra note 57, at 973.
Id. at 975.
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courts from considering all the circumstances related to a claimant’s
decision to leave work, the rule requires them to make determinations
based on imperfect or incomplete information. That prohibition creates a
certain amount of arbitrariness.
In fact, in some cases, the rule actually requires arbitrary decisionmaking. For example, the rule provides that claimants who quit because
their hours are reduced by at least 25% have good cause for leaving
work. 328 Under this rule, claimants who quit because their hours are
reduced by 24% are disqualified—even though a reduction of just 1%
more would be good cause. 329 That is the hallmark of arbitrariness, but it
is what the rule requires.
Additionally, the current rule actually creates bias against at least one
social group: women. As required by Washington’s then-governor Gary
Locke, who expressed “concerns . . . about the unforeseeable nature of
some of the practical effects of [the 2003] amendments,” 330 the ESD
studied the effects of those amendments. 331 The studies showed, among
other findings discussed below in Part IV.B, that women were
disproportionately disqualified under the new law. 332 Women were
denied benefits 12% more frequently than they had been under the
standard. 333 The study noted that women were often denied after leaving
work because of “domestic or marital responsibilities,” including “losing
child care; relocating because of a spouse’s job transfer; [and] relocating
to marry.” 334 This disproportionate burden on women is a result of the
2003 amendments, as the rules simply forbid the agency and the courts
from considering factors that are often of particular significance to

328. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(2)(b)(vi).
329. See id.
330. Letter from Gary Locke, Governor, State of Wash., to the Senate of the State of Wash. (June
20, 2003), available at http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2003-04/Pdf/Bills/Vetoes/
Senate/6097.VTO.pdf.
331. WASH. STATE EMP’T SEC. DEP’T, VOLUNTARY QUIT DECISIONS IN THE UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE PROGRAM: BEFORE AND AFTER IMPLEMENTATION OF SECOND ENGROSSED SENATE
BILL 6097, at 9–10 (2005) [hereinafter 2005 ESD STUDY], available at
http://www.leg.wa.gov/JointCommittees/UITF/Documents/12-01VoluntaryQuitStudy.pdf; WASH.
STATE EMP’T SEC. DEP’T, VOLUNTARY QUITS: DECEMBER 2006 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 ESD
STUDY], available at http://www.esd.wa.gov/newsandinformation/legresources/uistudies/vol-quits2006.pdf.
332. See 2006 ESD STUDY, supra note 331, at 4.
333. Id. at 3. (from July 1, 2004 through June 30, 2005, almost 2000 women were denied benefits
under the new rule, even though they would have qualified under the old standard).
334. Id. at 4.
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women. 335 In this way, the rule actually produces, rather than eliminates,
bias.
B.

The Rule Disqualifies Claimants Who Leave Work for Reasons
Consistent with the Purpose of the Employment Security Act

The rule-based statute is also inappropriate because it disqualifies
workers who, in standard-based adjudications, would be able to establish
good cause because they left work for reasons consistent with the
purpose of the Employment Security Act. 336 The study required by thengovernor Locke shortly after the 2003 amendments demonstrates that the
amendments’ primary effect was to reduce the number of claimants who
qualified for benefits. 337 The ESD provided two studies: one focused on
16,825 claims filed between July and December 2004 (“the 2005
Study”); 338 the other focused on 31,162 claims filed between July 1,
2004 and June 30, 2005 (“the 2006 Study”). 339
The 2005 Study concluded that, under the new rule, 73% of claimants
who voluntarily quit were found to lack good cause; under the old
standard, that number would have been 61%—a difference of 12%. 340
That is, 1,989 claimants who would otherwise have received benefits
were disqualified because of the rule. 341 This burden, as discussed in
Part IV.A.2, fell disproportionately on women: almost 14% more women
were disqualified because of the rule, while less than 10% more men
were disqualified. 342
The 2005 Study also described the circumstances of some claimants
who would have qualified under the standard but were disqualified under
the new rule. 343 The following are representative examples: 344

335. See id. (“This may be explained by the fact that domestic and marital responsibilities
predominantly fall to women in a household and when these responsibilities do not constitute good
cause under voluntary quit laws, women stand to be denied at a greater rate than men.” (emphasis
omitted)).
336. 2005 ESD STUDY, supra note 331, at 8–10.
337. Id. at 7 (“1,989 decisions denied UI benefits to individuals for reasons that would have been
allowed under the old law”); 2006 ESD STUDY, supra note 331, at 3 (“10.5 percent more people
would have been granted benefits under the old law”).
338. 2005 ESD STUDY, supra note 331, at 1.
339. 2006 ESD STUDY, supra note 331, at 5.
340. 2005 ESD STUDY, supra note 331, at 1.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 6.
343. See id. at 9–10.
344. See id.
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a claimant whose wages or hours were reduced by less than
25%, even though that reduction still imposed an
“unreasonable hardship” and was a “substantial involuntary
deterioration” of the claimant’s work; 345
• abusive workplace conditions, such as profane language and
bullying, that were not decent but were not actually illegal; 346
• a claimant whose employer required him to drive 150 miles
every day; initially, the claimant was given a company
vehicle, but the employer ultimately told the claimant to drive
his own vehicle and did not compensate him for wear and
tear; 347
• claimants who quit to relocate because of a spouse’s transfer,
if the spouse was not employed by the military; 348 and
• claimants who quit to care for children for any reason other
than illness or disability, including losing child care or trying
to help a child avoid expulsion from school. 349
The 2006 Study substantially corroborated these findings. 350 Of the
roughly 31,000 people who filed claims after voluntarily leaving work,
75.2% were found to lack good cause under the new rule; just 64.7%
would have been disqualified under the standard. 351 This difference of
10.5% meant that around 3300 unemployed people were denied benefits
as a result of the new rule, even though they left work for reasons
consistent with the purpose of the Employment Security Act. 352 Older
claimants, aged fifty-five years and older, were affected more seriously
than other age groups: they were denied benefits around 11% more
frequently than they would have been under the standard. 353 Similarly,
women were more seriously affected than men. 354 They were denied
12% more frequently, while men were denied around 9% more
frequently than they would have been under the standard. 355
There is no mistaking the data. The 2003 amendments reduced the
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.

Id. at 9.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See 2006 ESD STUDY, supra note 331, at 3.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 3, 11.
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number of workers who could establish good cause, even though they
left work for reasons consistent with the purpose of the Act. By
replacing the standard with the rule, the amendments denied benefits to
almost 3300 people who would otherwise have received benefits, at least
initially. 356 Stranding more than three thousand workers without the aid
of unemployment benefits does not advance the purpose of the Act.357
Instead, the rule thwarts that purpose. By denying the agency and the
courts discretion to interpret good cause, the new rule deprives people of
the benefits they need to survive during periods of unemployment—even
though their reasons for leaving work were consistent with the purpose
of the Act.
C.

A Standard Is Necessary to Advance the Purpose of the
Employment Security Act and the Remedial Purpose of
Unemployment Compensation Generally

The preamble to the Employment Security Act explains both the
consequences of unemployment and the importance of ameliorating its
effects. 358 The purpose of the Act is to protect and assist “persons
unemployed through no fault of their own, and [the Act is to] be liberally
construed for the purpose of reducing involuntary unemployment and
the suffering caused thereby to the minimum.” 359 The current rule-based
statute frustrates, rather than advances, that purpose.
As discussed in Part II.B, rules and standards tend to express certain
social values and discourage others. 360 Rules, at their best, promote
precision, efficiency, order, and stability. 361 However, they also express
rigidity, conformity, indifference, punitiveness, stinginess, and
sclerosis. 362 None of those values are consistent with the remedial
purpose of the Act or of unemployment compensation generally.
The Act is part of an unemployment compensation program that
serves a broad remedial purpose. It protects not only against the loss of
income, but also against the attendant social consequences of losing a
356. Id. at 3. The study focused only on the initial action that ESD would have taken, and it is
impossible to know how those cases would ultimately have been resolved. See 2005 ESD STUDY,
supra note 331, at 5 (“Insufficient time has passed since the study period to accurately determine the
outcomes of the appeal processes.”).
357. See WASH. REV. CODE § 50.01.010 (2012).
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. See supra Part II.B.
361. Kennedy, supra note 71, at 1710.
362. Id.
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job. 363 A rigid application—that is, a rule-based application—of the
statute that purports to advance those goals cannot possibly achieve
them. The rigidity and stinginess 364 often associated with rules prevent
such a system from providing an adequate remedy in this context.
Moreover, the Act is to be “liberally construed” for the benefit of
unemployed people. 365 Liberal construction of statutes “allows more
latitude for drawing inferences from statutory language” and “gives a
statute more elbow room for the sake of achieving statutory purposes
and goals.” 366 But the current rule does precisely the opposite: it
eliminates (not just restricts) an adjudicator’s discretion to use “elbow
room” to help protect people who are involuntarily unemployed. This is
inconsistent with liberal construction.
Standards, by contrast, more effectively advance the remedial goals of
unemployment compensation and of the Act. Standards promote
flexibility, individualization, equity, evolution, generosity, and
empathy. 367 These virtues are consistent with the goals of unemployment
compensation: not just to provide income to unemployed people, but
also to protect them more broadly during periods of unemployment. 368
Additionally, restoring discretion in a standard-based statute would
allow the kind of flexibility that is critical to liberal construction. 369 A
standard would therefore more effectively advance the purpose of the
Act and of unemployment compensation generally.
In short, the rule-based disqualification not only fails to advance the
purpose of the Employment Security Act, but also significantly frustrates
that purpose. That result is inconsistent with the statutory text 370 and
363. Eveline M. Burns, Unemployment Compensation and Socio-Economic Objectives, 55 YALE
L.J. 1, 10 (1945) (“Finally, the popularity of unemployment insurance, and its administrative
convenience as a device for assuring a continuous flow of income during substantial periods of
unemployment, coupled with a failure to devise socially acceptable and more obviously appropriate
methods of providing security for those excluded, have everywhere led to a broadening of the
functions of the unemployment insurance program.”).
364. See Kennedy, supra note 71, at 1710.
365. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.01.010 (2012). Although the legislature removed this language in
2003, see Act of June 20, 2003, ch. 4, sec. 1, § 2, 2003 Wash. Sess. Laws 2d Spec. Sess. at 2782–83
(codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 50.01.010 (Supp. 2003)), it restored the language in 2006. See Act
of Apr. 22, 2005, ch. 133, sec. 2, § 1, 2005 Wash. Sess. Laws 376, 377 (codified at WASH. REV.
CODE § 50.01.010 (2012)).
366. Morell E. Mullins, Sr., Coming to Terms with Strict and Liberal Construction, 64 ALB. L.
REV. 9, 38 (2000).
367. Kennedy, supra note 71, at 1710.
368. See Burns, supra note 363, at 15.
369. See Mullins, supra note 366, at 38.
370. See id.
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with the remedial goals of unemployment compensation more
generally. 371 A rule that so seriously compromises the goals of the
underlying statute is unjustifiable.
V.

PROPOSED REVISED STATUTORY TEXT

To cure (or at least ameliorate) the serious problems with the current
rule, Washington should amend its voluntary quit disqualification 372 and
restore standard-based language that allows the agency and the courts to
exercise discretion when determining whether a claimant had good cause
for leaving work.
First, the language of section 2(a) should be amended. 373 The current
statute contains language restricting good cause to the enumerated
reasons of section 2(b). 374 That language should be removed, and the
revised statute should read:
An individual shall be disqualified from benefits beginning with
the first day of the calendar week in which he or she has left
work voluntarily without good cause and thereafter for seven
calendar weeks and until he or she has obtained bona fide work
in employment covered by this title and earned wages in that
employment equal to seven times his or her weekly benefit
amount.
There is no theoretical problem with retaining section 2(b)’s enumerated
list of good cause reasons. 375 In fact, retaining those examples of good
cause could provide useful guidance to the agency and the courts. 376
However, an additional subsection should be added to the statute to
explain that other, non-enumerated reasons may also be good cause.
Section 2(b) should be amended to include the following subsection:
(xii) The individual left work for other good cause. Good cause
includes:
(A) Work-connected factors, such as the degree of risk involved
to the individual’s health, safety, and morals, the individual’s
physical fitness for the work, the individual’s ability to perform

371. See Burns, supra note 363, at 15.
372. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050 (2012).
373. Id. § 50.20.050(2)(a).
374. Id. (“Good cause reasons to leave work are limited to reasons listed in (b) of this
subsection.”).
375. Id. § 50.20.050(2)(b).
376. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 71, at 1710 (observing that rules can promote uniformity,
precision, certainty, and stability).
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the work, a substantial deterioration in the work or workplace,
and such other work-connected factors as the commissioner may
deem pertinent; and
(B) Compelling personal reasons that would cause a reasonably
prudent person to leave work.
Striking the last sentence of section 2(a) would, in conjunction with the
proposed revision to section 2(b), restore the administrative and judicial
discretion necessary for a fair application of the Act. These revisions
would return the voluntary quit statute to a more theoretically sound, and
more fundamentally just, standard.
CONCLUSION
For almost seventy years, the ESD and the courts had substantial
discretion to determine whether a claimant had good cause for leaving
work. Over the years, the legislature did somewhat restrict the scope of
that discretion. But until 2003 discretion played an important role in
ensuring that people who left work for reasons consistent with the
purpose of the Employment Security Act received the unemployment
benefits to which they were entitled. By allowing holistic, fact-specific,
individualized determinations, the standard-based statute ensured that
the Act served its purpose: to protect and assist people who were
unemployed through no fault of their own. But the 2003 and 2009
amendments—which removed all discretion and replaced it with a short,
exclusive list of good cause reasons—undermined the efficacy of the
Act. To give effect to the Act’s purpose, to reduce the suffering of
unemployed people, and to ensure the fundamental fairness of good
cause determinations, Washington should restore discretion to the statute
and return to a standard: “without good cause.”

